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The Origins of Social
Capital
Evidence From a Survey
of Post-Soviet Central Asia
Scott Radnitz
University of Washington
Jonathan Wheatley
Aarau Center for Democracy, University of Zurich, Switzerland
Christoph Zürcher
University of Ottawa
This article investigates the determinants of social capital by analyzing an
original survey of post-Soviet Central Asia. It tests hypotheses derived from
two related questions: whether networks, norms, and trust are empirically
related and the extent to which four factors—culture, regime type, percep-
tions of government responsiveness, and development interventions—predict
levels of social capital. The results show that trust and norms diverge from
networking. Interaction is higher under less repressive regimes and is further
increased by development interventions; trust and norms are higher under
conditions of greater repression. Culture does not affect any indicators of
social capital, but perceptions of responsiveness correlate with higher levels
of trust. As such, disaggregating social capital is a promising new direction
for research. Scholars should investigate why the components of social cap-
ital sometimes correlate but at other times diverge, and they should consider
the possibility of distinct causal mechanisms in their development.
Keywords: social capital; Central Asia; trust; norms; networks; interna-
tional development
Social capital (SC) is seen by economists, development experts, scholarsof democratization, and specialists of postconflict reconstruction alike
as a panacea for many fundamental problems that affect modern societies.
They widely argue that societies endowed with high levels of SC stand a
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better chance of becoming democratic, prosperous, and stable than do
societies lacking these endowments (Badescu & Uslaner, 2003). SC is espe-
cially important for low- and middle-income transition countries, given that
such countries face the triple challenge of democratization, economic
development, and avoidance of violent conflict (Kuzio, 2001). According to
most definitions, SC is based on norms of reciprocity and interpersonal
trust; it enables the formation of autonomous organizations, often through
social networks; and it increases the capacity of individuals linked by these
networks to act collectively. To quote Putnam’s famous formulation (1993),
SC refers to “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and
trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit”
(pp. 35–36; Woolcock & Narayan, 2001). SC is thought to have a benefi-
cial effect on an aggregated societal level because it increases the capacity
of individuals, groups, and organizations to reach out and form mutually
beneficial relationships with one another (Fukuyama, 1995).
Furthermore, scholars generally agree that SC is put to best use when the
state governs in a way that complements the activities of informal social
groups, as opposed to a way that is adversarial (Narayan, 1999; Woolcock
& Narayan, 2001). Putnam’s work (1993) on Italy demonstrated how SC,
as accumulated in horizontal civic associations, helped to increase the per-
formance of regional governments. As such, positive feedback loops of
high trust and cooperation in society strengthened the state in its ability to
provide public goods.
Given the wide agreement on the beneficial effects of SC, it comes as no
surprise that many scholars are intrigued by the question of how SC
emerges. It is well established that high levels of SC correlate with democ-
racy and economic growth; however, it is hotly disputed whether high levels
of SC are a cause or, rather, an effect (Edwards & Foley, 1998; Jackman &
Miller, 1998; Krishna, 2003). Our key question is therefore, what are the
origins of SC? For some scholars, SC reflects enduring cultural values that
have evolved over centuries (Fukuyama, 1995; Inglehart, 1997; Putnam,
1993). These norms then serve as the key exogenous factors in generating
economic and governmental performance. Such approaches essentially
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treat SC as a cultural phenomenon. Analysts adhering to this approach
regard SC as a set of independent variables. The causal link runs from cul-
turally evolved high levels of SC to better governance and better economic
performance.
Other scholars maintain that levels of SC can be altered through induced
structural change (Knack & Keefer, 1995; Schneider, Teske, Marschall,
Mintrom, & Roch, 1997). Such a view is closer to the thinking of original SC
theorists, such as Granovetter (1983) and Coleman (1988), who placed SC in
a rational choice framework. In their accounts, institutional context accounts
for the level of SC; hence, SC is treated as an endogenous entity. If this holds
true, then at the macro-level, the institutional framework of a democratic
regime would increase the level of SC, whereas that of more authoritarian
regimes would reduce it. Similarly, we would expect communities that pos-
sess institutions for representation, participation, and decision making to have
levels of SC higher than those of communities that lack these endowments.
Especially for countries in development or transition, the question of
whether SC is endogenous or exogenous is by no means an arcane acade-
mic question. One of the key strategies of international development relies
on the assumption that the level of SC is subject to policy intervention and
can so be increased by inducing the right changes to the institutional frame-
work (Henderson, 2002). With regard to low-income transition countries,
there has been a recent shift in the strategy of many leading development
agencies toward so-called community-driven development (Kay, 2005;
Peabody, Kuehnast, & Rana, 2003; Wassenich & Whiteside, 2004; World
Bank, 2000, 2002). This approach assumes that community-driven devel-
opment works best when the level of SC available to the communities is
high; consequently, community-driven development programs aim to
increase SC in their target communities. Increased levels of SC will then,
ideally, lead to better governance, more democracy, and economic growth.
This article therefore seeks to accomplish two tasks: first, to disaggre-
gate the concept of SC into three underlying components and so investigate
their relationship; second, to explore whether cultural factors or institu-
tional settings are better predictors of levels of SC. Standard definitions of
SC consist of three related concepts—trust, norms, and interaction (or net-
working)—and the common assumption that these concepts are correlated.
However, few empirical studies disaggregate the concept into its three com-
ponents and then measure them separately. For example, an overview of 13
empirical studies on SC reveals that none of them attempt to measure all
three components (Krishna, 2002, pp. 57-62). Seven studies use only a
Radnitz et al. / The Origins of Social Capital 709
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network-based measurement; four studies, a measurement based on net-
works and norms; and two studies, a measurement based only on norms.
This is not a problem as long as trust, norms, and networking are related
concepts that capture the same underlying reality and so positively correlate,
as is empirically the case for developed and democratic Western societies
(Raiser, Haerpfer, Nowotny, & Wallace, 2001). In member states of the
Organization of Economic and Cultural Development, effective political
institutions, high interpersonal trust, and norms that facilitate cooperation
are bundled in a self-reinforcing loop that has emerged over decades or even
centuries.
However, this is not necessarily the case in transition countries, such as
those in the former Soviet Union. Because the Soviet state crowded out civil
society and recruited ordinary citizens to spy on their neighbors, SC emerged
in dense personal networks used to secure resources to survive the shortage
economy (Howard, 2003; Ledeneva, 1998). After the Soviet collapse, new
institutions in the successor states partially inherited Soviet structures and
norms, thereby shaping the development of SC. Yet, the ways in which trust,
norms, and networks have grown together or drifted apart remain unclear.
Evidence from our community-level fieldwork in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Uzbekistan has led us to question the assumption that norms, trust, and
networking always correlate. For example, in many village communities that
we visited, people exhibited high levels of interpersonal trust. They also
expressed agreement with social norms that urge individuals and households
to engage in collective action. At the same time, however, people in some (but
not all) villages were socially isolated by their reliance on intimate informal
networks and did not interact frequently with other villages. This led us to
wonder whether trust, norms, and networking are separate phenomena and
whether all are similarly affected by the level of state control over society.
We should point out that political context is only one possible influence
on the strength of SC. In fact, studies have found wide variation between
countries of the same regime type, as well as regional variation within poli-
ties. For example, Miguel (2004) finds higher levels of cooperation and
local public goods provision in Tanzania than in Kenya owing to the for-
mer’s nation-building policies, despite the fact that the two countries
exhibit similar indicators for democratization.1 Varshney (2002) argues that
interethnic trust and cooperation developed in some parts of India but not
others, depending on historical legacies of civic engagement. Even within
the United States, studies have found variation in SC as a result of factors
such as ideological polarization, income inequality, ethnic diversity, and
levels of education (Iyer, Kitson, & Toh, 2005; Rahn & Rudolph, 2005).
710 Comparative Political Studies
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Although we do not test all possible influences on SC, we do include a vari-
ety of control variables to account for differences within countries.
Why Central Asia?
We base our investigation on data from two countries in Central Asia—
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan—for three reasons. First, there is a need to fill
in a gap in the literature on SC with regard to low-income and transitional
countries. The concept of SC was originally developed to explain outcomes
in wealthy Western countries and later tested in settings with different
historical trajectories, such as East Asia and Eastern Europe (Aberg,
2000; Carpenter, Daniere, & Takahashi, 2004; Helliwell, 1996; Rose,
1998). But it has yet to travel further east, especially into regions less often
visited by Western scholars and rarely incorporated into comparative
theory.2 Theoretically, these two countries are thought to face the double
burden of (a) the Soviet-era atomization of civil society and (b) inward-
looking and exclusive “clan-based” political systems. Our survey was
designed to illuminate whether societies with such debilitating legacies can
accumulate SC, even in the face of poverty and low levels of democracy.3
From a practical standpoint, Uzbekistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s transition
from a Soviet past, toward an uncertain future, provides a case study on
whether outside intervention can help in creating stable democratic institu-
tions and economic growth. After September 11, 2001, when the Central
Asian region gained new strategic importance, both countries became the
beneficiaries of substantial development aid that, in theory, would strengthen
civil society and empower people to shape their countries’ futures. In the
context of a political transition supported by substantial external financial
and technical assistance, the question of how SC develops in such a context
goes beyond purely academic interest and is of immense practical value.
A third reason is methodological: these two countries represent most-
similar cases that differ on a small number of potential explanatory vari-
ables. In addition to their preexisting geographical, linguistic, and cultural
similarities, 150 years of Russian and Soviet rule helped to level socioeco-
nomic and political differences that existed at the time of incorporation into
the Russian Empire (Jones Luong, 2002). Today, the countries rank simi-
larly on such indicators as income level and development;4 yet, the two
countries differ with regard to regime type and ethnic makeup. Kyrgyzstan
is consistently rated more democratic that Uzbekistan, as a result of liberal
reforms made in the first half of the 1990s.5 By contrast, Uzbekistan has
maintained significant political continuity from the Soviet Union. Freedom
Radnitz et al. / The Origins of Social Capital 711
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House gives it the lowest possible score on civil and political liberties, and
Parade Magazine (2006) has ranked its president, Islam Karimov, among the
10 worst dictators for 2 straight years. The heavy hand of the state is felt even
on the local level, where the regime has adapted neighborhood associations
into an apparatus to monitor and control the population (Sievers, 2002).
The ethnic distributions of the two countries allow us to test hypotheses
on the cultural determinants of SC. Whereas Uzbekistan is nearly homoge-
neous, Kyrgyzstan has a sizable minority of unassimilated ethnic Uzbeks
and (mainly urban) Slavs, which provides the opportunity for a natural
experiment. Using data on the ethnicity of respondents, we can test whether
differences between the countries are due to political environment or to
characteristics that reside within the ethnic group.
Measuring SC
There is no generally agreed measure of SC or its components because,
as Krishna (2003) convincingly argues, “networks, roles, rules, procedures,
precedents, norms, values, attitudes and beliefs are different among people
who have different patterns of life. Measures of social capital that are rele-
vant for one set of cultures can be irrelevant for others” (p. 7). Furthermore,
SC is not directly observable. We can measure only its manifestations or
behavioral consequences.
To ensure the validity of our survey instrument, we devised proxy mea-
sures for trust, norms, and networking that are locally appropriate and that
pick up social practices rather than attitudes.6 Such an approach is espe-
cially important in authoritarian countries, where respondents are prone to
mislead investigators in their attitudes toward political authorities. Also,
vague concepts such as general trust in people (Inglehart, 1997) and atti-
tudes toward democracy (Rose, 2002) are too abstract to be relevant to most
respondents and are less likely to reveal information about our primary
concern—behavior. Therefore, where possible, we designed our survey
questions to be specific and locally relevant but to also represent valid oper-
ationalizations of general concepts.
Norms
The first component of SC is the existence of social norms that facilitate
cooperation. Norms that favor voluntary contributions and short-term
sacrifices to a collective can generate long-term payoffs. When people
internalize notions of acceptable social behavior and encourage others to
712 Comparative Political Studies
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observe the same principles, these rules become self-enforcing over time,
thereby allowing a group to overcome prisoner’s dilemmas and so engage
in collective action (Elster, 1989; Ostrom, 1990). By contrast, the absence
of cooperative norms, as typified by Banfield (1958) and Putnam’s research
(1993) on southern Italy, may stem from (and also cause) widespread sus-
picion and alienation, which leads to noncompliance, self-centered behav-
ior, short time horizons, and collectively dismal outcomes.
To capture this concept, we conceptualize norm adherence as resting on
three principles: contributions to the group, the acceptance of sanctions,
and voluntary policing of noncooperation. To this end, we created an addi-
tive index of the following three survey questions, the responses to which
ranged from strongly agree to strongly disagree: “Every member should
contribute his or her free time and money to common projects and events in
his community,” “If a family does not act according to the accepted behav-
ior of our community, their behavior should be corrected,” and “It is the
responsibility of members of the community to correct the behavior of
people in the community whose behavior is not appropriate.”7 The resulting
composite variable ranges along a scale from 3 (weak community norms)
to 12 (strong community norms).
Trust
Second, we created a proxy measure for trust based how much respon-
dents trust various groups of people. The most commonly asked question
used to measure interpersonal generalized trust is of little help (i.e., “Do
you trust people in general?”) because it may elide important distinctions
that people make on the basis of ascriptive or other categories. To capture
actual social practices, we asked respondents how much they trust individ-
uals who belong to various relational categories, from the most proxi-
mate to the most distant: neighbors, members of the kin group (urug),
colleagues/coworkers, classmates, people from the same block or village,
people from the same district or town, and members of the same nationality.8
The value of the index varied on a scale from 7 (minimum trust of all the
above) to 28 (maximum trust).
Networking
Finally, the sine qua non of SC is social interaction. One way to ascer-
tain social interaction is to inquire about people’s memberships in different
civic associations (Narayan & Pritchett, 1999; Portney & Berry, 1997;
Radnitz et al. / The Origins of Social Capital 713
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Putnam, 1993). This approach may work well in countries with developed
civil societies and numerous formal associations, but in non-Western and
rural societies, it misses important interaction that takes place in informal
settings. To capture socially relevant interaction in developing countries
with weak civil society, we conceive of interaction more broadly, as
instances of social exchange in informal settings where people are most
likely to develop meaningful relationships.9
However, the measure should not be so broad as to include mundane inter-
action within one’s primary group (e.g., in the street in one’s own village),
given that those relationships are unlikely to produce significant social bene-
fits, such as new sources of information or financial assistance. We therefore
drew our proxy for networking from questions regarding how often respon-
dents socialize with other people beyond the community in various settings:
in private homes, at restaurants/teahouses, at sporting/recreational activities,
and at community markets (bazaars).10 The resulting composite variable
ranges in value from 4 (infrequent interaction) to 16 (regular interaction).
Data Collection
Our data come from an original survey of 2,000 respondents in
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (1,000 respondents from each country), con-
ducted in July and August 2005. It was administered in local languages
(Russian, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz) by the local staff of a research firm. Supervisors
hand-checked the completed questionnaires, and approximately 17% of
households were visited following completion of the survey for verification
purposes. Interviews lasted 45 to 60 min on average. See appendix for more
details on survey methodology.
Hypotheses
We specified and tested five hypotheses based on the theoretical literature.
Hypothesis 1: Trust, norms, and networking covary with one another.
Specifically, are trust, norms, and networking components of the same
concept? As reported above, it is taken as a given, both theoretically and
empirically, that “all good things go together.” Yet, under different economic
or social conditions, the three may develop in separate ways. This is an
empirical proposition, and it is testable.
714 Comparative Political Studies
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Hypothesis 2: A more democratic regime facilitates greater networking, stronger
norms, and higher levels of trust.
According to some scholars, SC can emerge only in an environment
where people feel secure enough to interact broadly and trust their fellow
citizens. As the bulk of the literature on SC in the postcommunist world
argues, Leninism left major (detrimental) legacies for the subsequent devel-
opment of society and democracy (Howard, 2003; Rose, 1998). By con-
trast, a more open and pluralistic regime should lay the foundation for
higher levels of SC.
Hypothesis 3: Ethnicity is a strong predictor of the level of SC.
An alternative view is that SC must be accumulated over long periods and
that it is dependent on culturally determined norms on values. It is by this
logic that Putnam (1993) argued that the cultural endowments for SC in Italy
were planted almost a millennium ago. Others have similarly argued for the
primacy of culture in determining a nation’s ability to achieve economic
growth and democracy (Fukuyama, 1995; Harrison, 1992; Landes, 1998).
Some scholars of Central Asia have asserted that the “Asian” character-
istics of most of the region’s inhabitants have impeded the emergence of
Western-style SC, whereas “European” Slavic nationalities possess more
favorable cultural traits for democracy.11 We test this argument directly by
including in our regressions a dummy variable for self-reported Russians
and Ukrainians (whom we code as Slavs). As a secondary test of this
hypothesis, we include dummy variables for each Kyrgyz and Uzbek.12
Hence, in our research context, if the longue durée of culture formation
matters, we expect to find one or more ethnic variables dominant over the
variable for the state in which the respondent lives. If, however, the politi-
cal context matters more, then the variable for the polity should prevail.
Hypothesis 4: More positive perceptions of the responsiveness of state institu-
tions correlate with higher levels of SC.
Previous empirical studies have shown that higher trust in state institu-
tions correlates with higher levels of SC (Bahry, Kosopalov, Kozyreva, &
Wilson, 2005). Consequently, we expect to find higher interpersonal trust
and more interaction within horizontal networks when respondents have a
positive perception of the government’s responsiveness. But rather than ask
an abstract question about trust in various state organizations (for the
Radnitz et al. / The Origins of Social Capital 715
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reasons stated above), we addressed people’s actual experience in dealing
with the state. Therefore, the survey asked respondents, how often does
“local government (village council, neighborhood committee) see to the
needs of people in your village/town?” Responses ranged from 1 (always)
to 5 (never).
Hypothesis 5: Assistance from a development organization leads to higher levels
of SC.
Finally, we investigate whether the policies of development organiza-
tions have an observable effect on the levels of SC. In rural communities,
development interventions are usually implemented by nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), which operate under the assumption that develop-
ment aid can be a major stimulus for local communities to accumulate SC.
We measure the influence of community-driven development by asking
respondents whether they had “received aid from a nongovernmental orga-
nization or international donor organization (for example consultation or
education, but not humanitarian help such as medicine or food) in the past
five years.”13
Analysis
To find out whether these hypotheses hold up empirically, we first con-
sider the relationship between trust, norms, and social interaction (network-
ing) to find out whether they are manifestations of the same underlying
phenomenon (i.e., SC) or whether they represent distinct concepts. We then
consider the factors that affect SC, operationalized as our three proxies. In
particular, we test the effect of the institutional setting (as proxied by the state
in which the respondent lives) and culture (as reflected by ethnicity). Next,
we consider the effect of the responsiveness of the state. Finally, we turn to
the role of development interventions, specifically to test whether receiving
assistance from an NGO or international organization enhances trust, norms,
and social interaction.
To test Hypothesis 1, we use two approaches: first, a simple bivariate
(Pearson) correlation and, second, a structural equation model based on the
hypothesis that trust, norms, and networking are constituents of a general
factor called SC.
The bivariate correlations show that the three components do not all cor-
relate (Table 1). Trust and norms are positively correlated at a significant
716 Comparative Political Studies
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level (p < .01) but only at .115. Networking is significantly correlated with
trust (p < .05) and norms (p < .01), but the association is negative. This
first operation therefore strongly refutes the idea that trust, norms, and
networking are components of a single underlying concept.
For a greater degree of refinement, we also conducted structural equa-
tion modeling, which tests whether the indicator variables for trust, norms,
and networking load onto a second-order factor, which we can call SC. If
they are all influenced by this underlying (so-called latent) variable, they
should all load significantly onto it. The structural equation modeling seen
in Figure 1 indicates that our three indicator variables do in fact load sig-
nificantly onto an underlying latent variable. However, we find that whereas
norms and trust are positively related to this variable, networking is nega-
tively correlated with it, thus confirming the bivariate correlations.
Both the structural equation model and our correlations therefore dis-
confirm Hypothesis 1 because networking does not covary positively with
either norms or trust. However, norms and trust both load positively onto
the same underlying factor and exhibit a degree of positive covariance. As
we argue below, the three factors are best explained by different indepen-
dent variables or are acted on in opposite ways by the same variables. This
indicates that trust, norms, and networking are at least partially independent
of one another and so cannot be considered aspects of the same phenome-
non. SC is therefore a more complex and multidimensional variable than
what is usually recognized.
To test Hypotheses 2–5, we use ordinary least squares regression analy-
sis. For each component of SC, we estimate five models. The first includes
only personal characteristics: well-being, age, education, gender, religios-
ity, residence in the capital city, and profession.14 The second introduces a
proxy as an independent variable (with a value of 0 or 1) representing
whether the respondent has been the beneficiary of activities by NGOs. In
the third model, we add a dummy variable that indicates the state in which
Radnitz et al. / The Origins of Social Capital 717
Table 1
Bivariate (Pearson) Correlations for Components of Social Capital
Trust Norms
Norms .115**
Networking –.050* –.079**
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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the respondent lives, taking a value of 1 if he or she lives in Kyrgyzstan and
0 if he or she lives in Uzbekistan. The fourth includes dummy variables
indicating whether the respondent self-identified as Slavic, Kyrgyz, or
Uzbek (to test Hypothesis 2). Last, the fifth regression substitutes the mea-
sure of perceived government responsiveness. The results are shown in
Tables 2–4.
To be able to make causal claims from our statistical analyses, we need
to be sure that the arrow of causality runs in the predicted direction. We can
assert with confidence that the control variables, along with the respon-
dent’s ethnicity and country of residence, are exogenously determined.
Receiving support from NGOs also, more likely than the reverse, influences
the extent of people’s networks or level of trust. However, the arrow of cau-
sation connecting perceptions of government responsiveness and SC is
ambiguous, thereby limiting our ability to make causal claims about the
relationship.
718 Comparative Political Studies
Figure 1
Structural Equation Model
Note: Estimated with LISREL 8.71 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993).
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The first striking trend that we observe from the regressions is that social
interaction is highly dependent on the state in which the respondent lives
(p < .001, see Table 2).15 Moving from a strongly authoritarian state
(Uzbekistan) to a semidemocratic polity (Kyrgyzstan) substantially
increases the likelihood of social interaction within and between communi-
ties. This finding strongly supports the first part of Hypothesis 2—that a
more liberal regime leads to more networking. This finding appears to be
solid, given the substantial increase in the value of the adjusted R2 in Model
3 (.166) over Model 2 (.073). The lack of significance of the ethnicity vari-
ables in Model 5 refutes the hypothesis that the state is significant only
because of the ethnic group that predominates on its territory.
However, the second and third parts of Hypothesis 2—that a more lib-
eral regime is conducive to stronger norms and higher levels of trust—is not
borne out in the cases surveyed. In fact, we can make a strong statement to
the contrary: A more authoritarian regime appears to facilitate stronger
norms and higher trust. The dummy variable for residence in less repressive
Kyrgyzstan, as opposed to more despotic Uzbekistan, is substantively and
statistically significant (p < .001) in all three models in which it is included
(Table 3). When both the state variable and the ethnicity variables are
included (Model 4), the latter are not significant. Similarly, moving from
Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan reduces the value of our proxy for trust to a sig-
nificant degree (Table 4), and once again, ethnicity is insignificant. Therefore,
in all our tests, the influence of the polity on SC dominated that of ethnicity.
Analyzing the relationship between perceptions of local government
responsiveness and SC (Model 5 in Tables 2–4) only partially bears out
Hypothesis 4. Perceptions of responsiveness have little impact on network-
ing or norms; the coefficients are small, and in neither case is the variable
significant. One relationship stands out, however: The perception of
responsiveness predicts higher levels of interpersonal trust (p < .05).
The implications of this result are somewhat ambiguous. Most notably,
the variable’s contradictory effect on the three dependent variables (nega-
tive for networking and norms, positive and significant for trust) provides
further evidence that the components of SC represent distinct concepts. The
relationship between state responsiveness and trust implies (optimistically)
the possibility of complementarity, in which social trust improves govern-
ment performance and vice versa. At the very least, the opposing principle
does not find full support—namely, that society functions better when the
state is weak or absent.
As for Hypothesis 5—that community-driven development aid increases
SC—the results indicate that the recipients of NGO or international donor
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aid have a greater tendency to network (p < .01; see Table 2, Models 2–5).
Exposure to donor aid is not significant in any regression for norms or trust,
but it has a large positive substantive effect on trust (.791 and .808 in
Models 3 and 4, respectively, in Table 4) and it achieves significance (p <
.10). Thus, it appears that community-driven development increases some
types of SC but not others.
Several of the demographic variables perform well in the regressions.
Living in the capital city seems to weaken norms and trust to a highly sig-
nificant degree (p < .001). Higher religious adherence, however, appears to
increase networking and trust (p < .05 in Tables 2 and 4). The effect of edu-
cation is positive and significant for networking and trust (p < .05 in the
case of trust, p < .01 for networking). As for occupation, white-collar work-
ers appear to be more prone to networking than are others (p < .01). Finally,
women and older respondents are, on average, far less prone to networking
than are younger and male respondents (Table 2), but gender and age have
a negligible effect on norms and trust.
Conclusion
This analysis calls into question the notion that SC is a monolithic phe-
nomenon. By disaggregating SC into trust, norms, and networking, we
found that these components do not all point in the same direction. Our
bivariate correlation and structural equation model show that norms and
trust (on one hand) and networking (on the other) negatively covary. We
also found that these components are influenced to different degrees by dif-
ferent variables—specifically, that a less repressive state and greater con-
tact with NGOs lead to a significantly higher level of networking, whereas
a more repressive state tends to increase norms and trust. Trust is also sig-
nificantly and positively related to perceptions of government responsive-
ness, whereas networks and norms are not. Taken together, these findings
suggest that observed levels of SC tend to vary, depending on the context,
whereas its component parts may stem from different causes.
Our results are consistent with literature that breaks down SC along a
different axis—bonding versus bridging (Narayan & Pritchett, 1999).
Bonding SC is a closed form, which operates within the confines of a close-
knit community. It consists of regularized but limited interactions within
the community, based on the observance of strong unwritten rules and
underscored by high levels of trust between close associates. Bridging is a
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more open form that involves interactions not only within and but also
across groups—the scopes of which are not limited by social norms.
Our analysis goes further, however, in investigating the cause of this diver-
gence. The tendency of individuals to interact in social networks situated
within or beyond the community may depend on the character of the political
environment that surrounds them. According to our analysis, the dummy vari-
able for the state in which the respondent lives is the most powerful factor
explaining the frequency of social interaction. Specifically, the more repres-
sive regime of Uzbekistan appears to have played a role in suppressing the for-
mation of social networks, in comparison with the more liberal Kyrgyzstan,
where citizens have been allowed to function with fewer restrictions.
Although our findings do not identify the causal mechanism by which a
repressive state influences citizen interaction, it is worth speculating on the
causes. As work on authoritarian regimes has shown, strong vertical link-
ages from the state to society, as characterized by surveillance and the
threat of repression, are an effective means of preventing concentrations of
power outside the state (Wiktorowicz, 2000). In Uzbekistan, the state main-
tained Soviet-style control over the economy and the society while actively
impeding the growth of civil society. By contrast, in Kyrgyzstan, where the
regime loosened its control over society and liberalized the economy, new
networks could develop that spanned beyond communities.
At the same time—and posing the greatest challenge to Putnam’s defin-
ition of SC (1993)—a repressive state appears to have the opposite effect
on the levels of norms and trust, increasing rather than decreasing them.
One explanation for this result is that although a high police presence in
Uzbekistan discourages people from extensively interacting in public
places, this lack of interaction cements citizens in their preexisting social
circles without exposing them to new people or ideas; so, they maintain
trust in those with whom they already frequently interact. Meanwhile, res-
idents of Kyrgyzstan have more opportunities to interact, by virtue of the
country’s political openness and partial transition to a market economy; yet,
impersonal exchanges do not necessarily engender greater trust or stronger
social norms—in fact, the opposite may occur when people are forced into
greater contact with new ideologies or competing ethnic groups.
On the question of whether SC is a cultural phenomenon with historical
roots or whether it can be altered through induced structural change, the
results of our analysis clearly point in the latter direction. Ethnicity plays
no discernable role in generating any of the three components of SC. The
activities of NGOs, however, may not affect the cognitive aspects of social
relations (i.e., norms and trust), but they appear to have had a structural
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impact, by increasing networking among individuals who have received
aid. These findings may have implications for the development community.
Contrary to the criticisms of NGO activity in the former Soviet Union
(Henderson, 2002; Mendelson & Glenn, 2002), there may be long-term
payoffs for the international community to invest in strengthening citizen
interaction. It is unclear whether greater networking alone leads to concrete
social and political benefits, but broad-based interaction is a prerequisite for
a strong civil society and, therefore, a healthy democracy.
The responsiveness of government adds another layer of complexity,
having a positive and significant influence on trust but not on norms and
interaction. Along similar lines, Bahry et al. (2005) find a relationship
between trust in government and trust in other ethnic groups in Russia.
They speculate that this is due to the “provision of stable rules of the game”
(p. 530). Although this interpretation is reasonable—and although it is true
that in Central Asia, as in Russia, government can be responsive without
being democratic—it is also possible that the causality runs in reverse:
People who trust their fellow citizens may not demand much from the state,
if they feel secure. Yet, people who live in fear of their neighbors may
demand more intervention from the state to protect their property but will
be disappointed when the state is unable or unwilling to provide security.
Given that scholars will continue to investigate the origins and determi-
nants of SC, this analysis suggests several avenues for further research. We
believe that there are benefits in disaggregating SC and testing it in diverse
contexts, as other quantitative studies have done, even though we have not
neared consensus. For example, Paxton (1999) tests Putnam’s argument
(1993) about the decline of SC in the United States by separating the mea-
surement of trust from that of participation in associations (formal and infor-
mal). She finds that although trust in individuals has declined, the level of
association has remained the same. Pargal et al. (1999) devise separate mea-
sures of participation in civic associations, trust, and norms of reciprocity to
explain the community-based provision of trash collection in Bangladesh,
noting that membership in associations is not associated with trust or norms.
Krishna and Uphoff (1999) similarly disaggregate trust, reciprocity, and sol-
idarity in a study of development outcomes in India, but they find that the
three variables correlate well enough to include them in a single index of SC.
These studies suggest that the way that concepts are operationalized and the
context in which the survey takes place play a large part in determining
whether the components of SC are seen to reinforce each other or to
function independently. These differing results should lead us to question
the utility of SC as an omnibus concept and so direct our efforts toward
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finer-grained research into the properties of its component parts. As such,
one avenue worth exploring is the causal relationships between them.
Disaggregating the components suggests several ways in which they
might be related. One possibility is that they originate from different
sources. As we have seen, networking may be affected by exogenous factors,
such as NGO interventions and political liberalization. Norms and trust,
however, may have cultural or ideational, rather than structural, roots,
thereby causing them to develop independently of interaction. Alternatively,
they may occupy different positions on the causal path. Rose (1998) criti-
cizes Putnam’s definition of SC for “conflating different elements in the
causal chain” (p. 151), arguing that networks form as a consequence of trust.
Jackman and Miller (1998), echoing Coleman (1988), take the opposing
view, arguing that civic organizations that provide a public good generate
trust as a by-product. These studies can be combined with insights in other
areas, such as urban sociology and social psychology, to identify the mech-
anisms underlying different causal paths. For example, research on the con-
tact hypothesis has shown that increased interaction between groups can
lead to more positive racial attitudes (Sigelman & Welch, 1993).
Experiments on group behavior and public goods have found that under cer-
tain conditions, people will voluntarily cooperate with groups of strangers to
develop self-enforcing norms of reciprocity (Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter,
2002; Ostrom, 2000). The study of how the components of SC arise and
interact can benefit from incorporating such micro-level research.
A final suggestion for future research has to do with measurement. How
we operationalize concepts is critical in determining the quality of the data
we get. For example, abstract notions of trust (in people or governments)
may tell us little that is meaningful about people’s actual behavior and, in
turn, the propensity to engage in collective action. Measures of membership
in bowling leagues and debating clubs, although easily quantifiable, may be
a misleading indicator of actual social practice and so tell us nothing about
the society in question. Here, we face a trade-off of internal versus external
validity, given that measurements that capture the nuance and complexity
of social life and are appropriate in one setting are not certain to travel to
other contexts. It may therefore be necessary to specify the settings in
which we can test the same indicators of SC (formal or informal organiza-
tions; trust across ethnic, religious, or regional divides) and get consistent
and generalizable results. Refining our tools of measurement should
improve our cumulative knowledge about this elusive concept.
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Appendix
Survey Methodology
The survey was administered to 1,000 respondents in Kyrgyzstan and 1,000 in
Uzbekistan in July and August 2005. It included all 13 Uzbekistan oblasts and 6
of the 7 Kyrgyzstan oblasts. (Batken Oblast in Kyrgyzstan and several districts in
both countries were excluded for logistical reasons.) Interviews were conducted
by local trained staff in Russian, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz, according to the preferences
of the interviewees. Questionnaires were written in English, translated into local
languages, then back-translated to verify accuracy. A pilot survey of 30 respon-
dents was conducted before administering the actual survey. The average
response rate was 70% in Uzbekistan and 85% in Kyrgyzstan.
The sampling scheme was designed to capture a representative sample in each
country of noninstitutionalized permanent residents older than 18 years. A three-
stage stratified clustered sampling procedure was used. First, provinces were pro-
portionally stratified by population, then by their share of urban and rural
populations. Within each stratum, primary sampling units were selected according
to the population. In cities, such units were neighborhood-based administrative
units (mahallinskiy komitet) in Uzbekistan and city subdivisions in Kyrgyzstan,
with populations ranging from 4,000 to 5,000. In rural areas in both countries, pri-
mary sampling units were village councils—formerly, village soviets—which are
the lowest level of government. Within primary sampling units, households
(including individual apartments in high-rise buildings) were sequentially num-
bered from household registration books and drawn by a random-number
scheme. Individual respondents were chosen via the Kish grid (Kish, 1965). The
sample was weighted to correct for discrepancies from the sampled population in
sex and age, based on the most recent census (2002 in Uzbekistan; 1998 for
Kyrgyzstan) and in the population of the primary sampling units.
Notes
1. See Freedom House, at http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls.
2. A recent exception is Jamal (2007). Ruffin and Waugh (1999) address civil society in
Central Asia but in a cursory way.
3. Where scholars have identified social capital in the region, it is usually in the form of sui
generis and “Eastern” institutions, such as clan, mahalla (neighborhood quarter), and Islamist
groups. See Babajanian, Freizer, and Stevens (2005), Freizer (2005), and Collins (2006).
4. The Human Development Index ranks Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan at 110th and 113th
place, respectively (United Nations Development Programme, 2006).
5. According to the Polity IV scores, which rates the character of a country’s regime on
a scale from 10 (fully democratic) to –10 (fully autocratic), Kyrgyzstan was considerably less
autocratic than Uzbekistan, with Kyrgyzstan scoring a –3 every year from 1991 to 2003 and
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with Uzbekistan being “almost fully autocratic,” with a score of –9 for the same period. In
2006, Freedom House rated Kyrgyzstan as “partly free” and Uzbekistan as “not free.”
6. Howard (2003, p. 9) uses the same approach in surveying postcommunist citizens.
7. A factor analysis of these variables showed that the three questions were sufficiently
congruent to combine into a single variable.
8. Factor analysis showed that these seven indicators could combine into a single vari-
able. The analysis showed that, broadly speaking, there were two types of people: those who
trusted their fellow citizens and those who did not. The former group tended to express high
levels of trust in all categories of people, whereas the latter group tended to be less trustful.
9. Other scholars of postcommunism have used similar measures to capture informal net-
works. For example, Gibson’s survey (2001) asks respondents in Russia to name three people
with whom they “discuss important matters” (p. 56). The World Bank’s questionnaire on social
capital quantifies, in addition to group membership, the respondent’s “sociability,” defined as
“meetings with people in public places, visits to other people’s homes or visits from others into
one’s own home, and participation in community events such as sports or ceremonies”
(Grootaert, Narayan, Jones, & Woolcock, 2004, p. 21).
10. A factor analysis of these variables showed that the four indicators were sufficiently
congruent to combine into a single variable. To ensure that this measure is not simply a proxy
for the ease of travel, we include in the regressions controls that may affect mobility, such as
age, gender, well-being, and residence in the capital.
11. See McMann (2006, pp. 16-17) for a good summary of culture-based arguments as
applied to Central Asia.
12. The ethnicity variables do not simply proxy for the state in which the respondent lives.
Whereas the population of Uzbekistan comprises more than 80% ethnic Uzbeks (83% in our
sample), in Kyrgyzstan only 65% of the population is Kyrgyz, about 15% are Slavic, and 10%
to 15% are Uzbek (66%, 19%, and 10% respectively in the sample).
13. We consider this a fair test of the impact of internationally driven aid programs, given
that virtually all nongovernmental organizations in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan rely on fund-
ing by international donors. See Alymkulova and Seipulnik (2005). Humanitarian help is
specifically excluded because direct aid is not thought to increase the levels of social capital,
whereas other types of local aid (such as capacity building or infrastructural projects) are com-
monly associated with community-mobilizing programs.
14. Well-being was determined from the answer to the question “Which of the following
best describes the level of well-being of your household?” Respondents were able to select
from a list of five options reflecting their purchasing power, ranging from “It is difficult for us
to afford even basic goods and food” to “We can buy everything that we need.” The variable
for religiosity was constructed from respondents’ replies to three questions related to how
often they pray, go to the mosque, and fast. The values of this proxy range from 3 (not reli-
gious at all) to 12 (very religious). Capital city was chosen over a dummy variable for
urban/rural residence because, in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, residents of the capital typ-
ically display greater cultural and social differences from the rest of country than do urbanites
versus people in the countryside; therefore, they are more likely to be associated with differ-
ent levels of social capital. Profession was coded as a dummy for “white-collar worker.”
15. We used the square root of the proxy for networking in the regression model to better
ensure that normality and homoscedasticity assumptions were satisfied.
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